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English Abstract 
Recipient design is a key constituent of intersubjectivity in interaction. Recipient 
design of turns is informed by prior knowledge about and shared experience with 
recipients. Designing turns in order to be maximally effective for the particular 
recipient(s) is crucial for accomplishing intersubjectively coordinated action. This 
paper reports on a specific pragmatic structure of recipient design, i.e. counter-
factual recipient design, and how it impinges on intersubjectivity in interaction. 
Based on an analysis of video-recordings data from driving school lessons in 
German, two kinds of counterfactual recipient design of instructors' requests are 
distinguished: pedagogic and egocentric turn-design. Counterfactual, pedagogic 
turn-design is used strategically to diagnose student skills and to create opportu-
nities for corrective instructions. Egocentric turn-design rests on private, non-
shared knowledge of the instructor. Egocentrically designed turns imply expecta-
tions of how to comply with requests which cannot be recovered by the student 
and which lead to a breakdown of intersubjective cooperation. This paper identi-
fies practices, sources and interactional consequences of these two kinds of coun-
terfactual recipient design. In addition, the study enhances our understanding of 
recipient design in at least three ways. It shows that recipient design does not only 
concern referential and descriptive practices, but also the indexing intelligible 
projections of next actions; it highlights the productive, other-positioning effects 
of recipient design; it argues that recipient design should be analyzed in terms of 
temporally extended interactional trajectories, linking turn-constructional prac-
tices to interactional histories and consecutive trajectories of joint action. 
Keywords: recipient design – counterfactual recipient design – egocentrism – intersubjectivity – 
misunderstandings – corrections – requests – driving school  
German Abstract 
Der Adressatenzuschnitt von Äußerungen (recipient design) ist eine wesentliche 
Voraussetzung für die Herstellung von Intersubjektivität in der Interaktion. Adres-
satenzuschnitt speist sich aus präinteraktivem Wissen bzw. Einschätzungen be-
züglich des Interaktionspartners und aus gemeinsamen Interaktionserfahrungen. In 
diesem Beitrag wird eine spezifische Form des Adressatenzuschnitts, nämlich 
kontrafaktischer, d.h. nicht den Gegebenheiten des faktischen Adressaten entspre-
chender Adressatenzuschnitt untersucht. Auf der Grundlage von Videoaufnahmen 
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tions and Lorenza Mondada and Emma Betz for detailed discussion and comments on a prior 
version of this paper. I thank Darja Enns for data-recording and transcription and the driving 
instructor and the students for their permission to use their recordings for my research. Wes 
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deutscher Fahrschulstunden werden zwei Formen des kontrafaktischen Adressa-
tenzuschnitts von Turns des Fahrlehrers unterschieden: Pädagogischer und ego-
zentrischer Adressatenzuschnitt. Kontrafaktischer pädagogischer Adressatenzu-
schnitt wird strategisch verwendet, um den Kompetenzerwerb der Schülers zu 
testen und, im negativen Falle, Gelegenheit zur korrektiven Instruktion zu bieten. 
Egozentrischer Adressatenzuschnitt beruht auf privatem Wissen des Fahrlehrers, 
welches vom Studenten nicht geteilt wird. Egozentrisch gestaltete Turns beinhal-
ten Erwartungen darüber, wie Schüler die Aufforderungen des Fahrlehrers zu er-
füllen haben, welche von den Schülern nicht erschlossen werden können. Dies 
führt schließlich zu einem Zusammenbruch der intersubjektiven Kooperation zwi-
schen Lehrer und Schüler. Im vorliegenden Beitrag werden Praktiken, Quellen 
und interaktive Konsequenzen beider Formen kontrafaktischen Adressatenzu-
schnitts dargelegt. Die Untersuchung trägt darüber hinausgehend in drei Hinsich-
ten zu einem vertieften Verständnis von Adressatenzuschnitt in der Interaktion 
bei: Sie zeigt, dass Adressatenzuschnitt nicht nur die Wahl referenzieller Ausdrü-
cke und die Gestaltung von Deskriptionen, sondern auch die Formulierung hinrei-
chend verständlicher Handlungserwartungen (Projektionen) betrifft; sie zeigt, dass 
Adressatenzuschnitt nicht nur retrospektiv auf Einschätzungen des Adressaten 
aufbaut, sondern prospektiv-performativ den Adressaten als Beteiligten mit be-
stimmten Fähigkeiten, Eigenschaften usw. fremdpositioniert; sie weist aus, dass 
Adressatenzuschnitt nicht als punktuelles Turndesign zu verstehen ist, sondern 
dass Praktiken der Turnkonstruktion auf die Interaktionsgeschichte der Teilneh-
mer und den folgenden Verlauf des gemeinsamen Handelns zu beziehen sind. 
Keywords: Adressatenzuschnitt – kontrafaktischer Adressatenzuschnitt – Egozentrismus – Inter-
subjektivität – Missverstehen – Korrekturen – Aufforderungen – Fahrschule  
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1. Intersubjectivity, recipient design and egocentrism 
1.1 Two facets of intersubjectivity 
The notion of intersubjectivity has recently gained currency in conversation ana-
lysis. Building on earlier writings by Heritage (1984:254-260) and Schegloff 
(1992), conversation analysts have come to conceive of the accomplishment of 
intersubjectivity in interaction as lying at the heart of conversational cooperation 
(Deppermann 2008, 2015a; Sidnell 2014; Finnish Centre of Excellence in Re-
search on Intersubjectivity in Interaction2). Still, intersubjectivity is not a homoge-
neous concept. We need to distinguish at least two very different understandings 
and facets of intersubjectivity: intersubjectivity as idealization (henceforth: inter-
subjectivity-1) and intersubjectivity as practical accomplishment (henceforth: 
intersubjectivity-2).  
The term 'intersubjectivity' was introduced by Husserl (1929:§§42-62) in his 
Cartesian Meditations. For Husserl the objectivity of the life-world rests on pri-
mordial intersubjectivity-1. It guarantees that the world-for-me is considered as an 
objective world, because it is basically experienced in the same way as we sup-
pose that others experience the world as well. In Husserl's analysis, this primordial 
intersubjectivity-1 is revealed to be constituted by the transcendental ego. Inter-
subjectivity-1 ultimately is a monadic product of the individual consciousness 
(whose general structures, however, are impersonal and species-generic). Exten-
ding Husserl's ideas in the pursuit of developing a "proto-sociology" of subjective 
foundations of human sociality, Schütz (1974[1932]), and Schütz/Luckmann 
(1979, 1984) have elaborated the notion of intersubjectivity-1 by exploring in 
more depths what Schütz (1974[1932]:137) calls the "general thesis of the alter 
ego". It includes the "idealizations of the reciprocity of perspectives" (Schütz/ 
Luckmann 1979:88f.), most importantly the "Austauschbarkeit der Standpunkte" 
(interchangeability of standpoints) and the "Kongruenz der Relevanzsysteme" 
(congruence of the relevance systems). Intersubjectivity-1 is presumed by spea-
kers as a communicative apriori, i.e. in order to communicate. It needs to be 
presumed as the belief that the recipient will be able to understand a meaningful, 
i.e. not causally effective action. In the absence of this presumption, it would be 
futile to communicate. Intersubjectivity-1 concerns a set of very general, formal 
taken-for-granted assumptions guiding the understanding of social action (see also 
Garfinkel 1967). It does not concern a specific stock of knowledge, the meaning 
of particular linguistic forms and actions, and specific ascriptions about emotional 
states, intentions etc. to individual recipients. Intersubjectivity-1 amounts to 
treating the recipient as an alter ego, i.e. as another subjectivity endowed with the 
most general structures of intentionality, which are prerequisites for constructing 
intersubjectivity-2 (see also Duranti 2009).  
In contrast to intersubjectivity-1, intersubjectivity-2 is a practical accomplish-
ment which results from a sequential trajectory of interaction (Schegloff 1992; 
Sidnell 2014; Deppermann 2015a). Intersubjectivity-2 arises over a minimal se-
quence of three positions:  
  
                                                          
2  www.intersubjectivity.fi 
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(1) For any action-to-be-understood in interaction,  
(2) recipients are expected to display how s/he understands the action-to-be-
understood; 
(3) the producer of the action-to-be-understood has to display if s/he accepts what 
s/he takes up as recipient's understanding of his/her turn. 
In the third positioned turn, thus, the producer of the action-to-be-understood can 
(and is expected to) display his/her reflexive, 2nd order display of understanding, 
which is a display of intersubjectivity-2 (cf. Schneider 2004:325ff.). Of course, 
intersubjectivity-2 needs neither be established nor settled once for all by the 
minimal three-position-sequence (see Schegloff 1992; Deppermann 2008, 2015a), 
and it is always only accomplished for practical purposes and until further notice. 
What counts for our current discussion, is that intersubjectivity-2 is an emergent, 
observable, shared product of the interaction. It amounts to "grounding" 
(Clark/Brennan 1991; Clark 1996) the meaning of prior turns, making them part 
of the participants' common ground to be used to build further cooperation on. In 
contrast to intersubjectivity-1, intersubjectivity-2 is not species-general and for-
mal, but partner-specific and action/content-specific: It concerns the meaning of a 
specific action, reference, interactional modality etc. and it is accomplished with 
regard to specific elements of knowledge, emotional states, intentions, etc.  
1.2 Recipient design and intersubjectivity 
The concept 'recipient design' was canonically introduced by Sacks et al. (1974: 
727):  
By 'recipient design' we refer to a multitude of respects in which the talk by a party 
in a conversation is constructed or designed in ways which display an orientation 
and sensitivity to the particular other(s) who are co-participants. In our work, we 
have found recipient design to operate with regard to word selection, topic selec-
tion, admissibility and ordering of sequences, options and obligations for starting 
and terminating conversations etc.3  
Recipient design is a key feature in accomplishing intersubjectivity in interaction. 
It is crucial for building the bridge between intersubjectivity-1 and intersubjectivi-
ty-2 in interaction. Recipient design rests on speaker's prior experience with the 
recipients of a turn (or a larger trajectory of actions) to be produced. If relevant 
shared experiences are lacking, recipient design is based on expectations derived 
from (common) membership in social categories. This, however, quickly is over-
ridden by common ground from shared experience as soon as it is available 
(Isaacs/Clark 1987). Recipient design is intrinsically intertwined with intersub-
jectivity in several ways: 
(1) Like intersubjectivity-1, it rests on and embodies the speaker's assumptions 
about recipients. 
(2) Unlike intersubjectivity-1, but rather like intersubjectivity-2, it concerns local, 
specific ascriptions of attention, knowledge, intentions, probable understand-
                                                          
3  See already Sacks (1992:230) for an earlier use of the term.  
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ings, etc. (henceforth: subjective states) which just this/these "particular 
other(s)" (Sacks et al. 1974:727) entertain(s) at the particular interactional mo-
ment with respect to the particular turn/action to be produced. By this, re-
cipient design is a particularization of species-specific intersubjectivity-1 with 
respect to the precise, fleeting (mental, physical) states of the recipient(s) as 
they matter for the here and now of the interaction. 
(3) Unlike intersubjectivity-1, but akin to intersubjectivity-2, recipient design of-
ten does not only implicitly presuppose recipients' properties, but it may ex-
plicitly formulate or relatively unequivocally index relevant facets of the re-
cipient. 
(4) Recipient design is itself responsive to intersubjectivity-2: It is engendered 
and continuously adapted and reworked by virtue of (shared) interactional ex-
periences, which allow the speaker to infer recipient's subjective states, which 
can be presupposed for the production of a turn. Recipient design can often be 
seen to be adjusted online during turn-production by reacting to recipients' 
(mainly embodied) simultaneous responses to the turn-in-progress (Goodwin 
1979). Turn-production itself therefore is already often under intersubjective 
control. Recipient design thus rests on an emergent and continuously updated 
cognitive "partner model" (Deppermann/Blühdorn 2013). Recipient design it-
self, however, is not a cognitive process, but it is a design feature of discursive 
action. It may more or less overtly communicate those aspects of the partner 
model, which account for the recipient design. However, given a specific re-
cipient-designed turn, the underlying partner model may also stay largely 
opaque to the recipient. While the relevant aspects of the partner model may 
be made explicit by recipient-designed turns, they may as well only be in-
dexed, remain highly ambiguous or even unrecoverable.  
(5) Like both intersubjectivity-1 and intersubjectivity-2, recipient design does not 
simply mirror properties of the factual recipient, but it is productive in nature. 
While recipient design may and mostly does rest on experiences with the fac-
tual recipient (when available), it may also be highly constructive in other-po-
sitioning the recipient as a recipient with certain locally relevant properties (on 
positioning in interaction see Deppermann 2015b). Like intersubjectivity, re-
cipient design always and necessarily relies on the recipient as conceived of 
by the speaker, but never on the factual recipient. There is an ontological dif-
ference between recipients from the speaker's point of view and factual recipi-
ents, which may also include unintended or unexpected recipients. In addition, 
the speaker may produce a counterfactual recipient design of turns for some 
strategic reason. By 'counterfactual recipient design', I refer to cases in which 
the speaker positions the recipient as someone the speaker knows the recipient 
is not in order to achieve certain communicative effects (see sect. 4 below).  
In this way recipient design is decisive for building the bridge between presumed 
intersubjectivity-1 and accomplished intersubjectivity-2 in interaction. This 
bridging works in two ways: Firstly, recipient-designed turns index partner-spe-
cific and action/content-specific assumptions about intersubjectivity-1; secondly, 
recipient design is constantly updated on the basis of emerging intersubjectivity-2, 
i.e. by virtue of partners' displays of their understandings, intentions, emotions, 
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etc. This crucially implies that speakers are provided with a proof procedure 
(Sacks et a. 1974:728) for the adequacy and efficiency of the recipient design of 
their turns, thus allowing them for adaptions of the recipient design of their future 
turns.  
1.3 Prior research on recipient design in CA 
In CA, 'recipient design' is often used as an analytical notion and even presup-
posed as an unquestioned assumption in the sense that every turn or action is re-
cipient-designed. In contrast, there is a surprising lack of studies which are spe-
cifically devoted to practices, sources, properties, dimensions and interactional 
consequences of recipient design. Classic studies have dealt with the choice of 
referential terms for persons (Sacks/Schegloff 1979; Schegloff 1996) depending 
on the knowledge of the recipient. Preferences for recognition and minimization 
of reference forms were identified. Another seminal study along these lines, al-
though not explicitly using the term 'recipient design', is Schegloff (1972), which 
focuses on place formulations. Deppermann and Blühdorn (2013; Deppermann 
2014) study the use of negation as a practice for excluding unwanted interpreta-
tions of speaker's turns which the recipient does or might be seen to entertain.  
The prime relevance of recipient design for turn-construction becomes parti-
cularly evident in multi-party-interaction. In an early study, Goodwin (1979) 
showed how a speaker expands his turn while changing addresses (after failed 
uptake), thereby changing the ongoing action and conveying different information 
about the subject matter tailored to the states of knowledge of the different recipi-
ents. Hutchby (1995) shows how hosts and invited experts in radio-phone-ins de-
sign their advice turns and summaries with respect to both the individual caller 
and the anonymous audience, for which the problem talked about might be inter-
esting in a more generic version. In a similar vein, Hitzler (2013) shows how so-
cial workers produce different versions of descriptions in so called Hilfeplange-
sprächen ('care-planning-sessions'). Depending on whether professional collea-
gues, children or parents are the primary addressees, descriptions are adapted to 
the kinds and state of knowledge and to the degree of epistemic authority at-
tributed to the party addressed. Mondada (2015) analyzes the multimodal prac-
tices by which a moderator simultaneously manages to attribute positions and au-
thorship to individual participants while reformulating summaries of proposals 
and assessments to a large audience. 
While these studies mainly focus on practices on recipient design which pre-
suppose certain properties of the recipient, some other studies deal with the emer-
gence and changes of recipient design over interactional episodes. In an early 
study, Terasaki (2004) showed how pre-announcements of news are designed as 
to adapt a projected news delivery to the knowledge status of the recipient. Per-
spective display sequences (Maynard 1989) are means to elicit assumptions about 
the recipient in order to use them to impart news that are adapted to what the part-
ner expects. Deppermann and Schmitt (2009) show how recipient design is sys-
tematically prepared in the interactional process by a speaker who tests his recipi-
ent's knowledge by constructing interactive tasks. Online-analysis of the recipi-
ent's performance is then used to adapt consecutive pedagogic turns to what has 
been revealed about the recipient's knowledge, self-assessment and self-position-
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ing. The recipient's locally relevant properties, i.e., his/her knowledge, motives, 
stances, identity features, etc., to which turn-design is adapted, are not settled 
once for all. Relevant properties of the recipient change and evolve continually 
over an interactional episode. Schmitt and Knöbl (2013) consider how recipient 
design is produced multi-modally. They argue that recipient design evolves over 
an extended process of action as a holistic gestalt: Recipient design makes use of 
design-resources, which only amount to a distinctive, partner-specific recipient 
design with an individual fingerprint by virtue of combinations of resources over 
temporally extended interactional trajectories. The linguistic features of recipient 
design, motivations for it and its function thus have to be analyzed with an eye to 
the interactional history of the parties, which accounts for the unique adequacy 
(Psathas 1995) of situated recipient design.  
Malone (1995, 1997:ch.5) takes a different approach, considering recipient de-
sign as a strategy of alter-casting (Weinstein/Deutschberger 1963), i.e., persuad-
ing the recipient strategically. In Malone's work, as in Deppermann/ Schmitt 
(2009) and Schmitt/Knöbl (2013), the potential of recipient design to other-posi-
tion the recipient design productively, beyond what s/he already revealed 
him/herself to be in the past, is highlighted.  
1.4 Prior research on recipient design in cognitive social psychology 
Conversation analysts are not alone in being interested in recipient design. Prefer-
ring the notion 'audience design', cognitive social psychologists have also a his-
tory of studying experimentally, if and how speakers adapt their actions and turn-
design to what they know about their interlocutors (for overviews see 
Schober/Brennan 2003; Kecskes/Mey 2008; Brennan et al. 2010). Part of this re-
search provides ample evidence that and how speakers adapt their actions, in par-
ticular, their choice of referential expressions, to their shared conversational expe-
rience with specific partners (e.g. Clark/Marshall 1981; Clark/Wilkes-Gibbs 1986; 
Isaacs/Clark 1987; Brennan/Clark 1996; Horton/Gerrig 2005; Horton 2008). This 
is evidenced e.g. by the use of definite NPs, demonstratives, increasingly shorter 
and dyad-specific referring expressions ("conceptual pacts", Brennan/Clark 1996).  
1.5 Prior research on the egocentric speaker in cognitive psychology 
Whereas Herbert Clark and his followers try to prove that people regularly use 
metacognitive reasoning and take the addressee's perspective into account when 
producing turns-at-talk, other cognitive researchers argue that speakers prefer to 
act mostly egocentrically (e.g. Keysar 2008). They hold that the speakers do not 
regularly take the partner's perspective and what is shared as common ground into 
account when designing an action. According to this position, intersubjectivity is 
mostly accomplished by automatic alignment of representations without explicit 
meta-representation of the partner's knowledge (Pickering/Garrod 2004). Speakers 
can be shown to underestimate how ambiguous their actions may be for recipients 
and how they may be misunderstood. They neglect to use partner-specific 
knowledge when designing their actions (Keysar 2008), especially under condi-
tions of multi-tasking and reduced capacity of working memory (Lin/Keysar/ 
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Epley 2010). These researchers argue that speakers act basically egocentrically. 
According to this position, intersubjectivity is a by-product of egocentric action, 
which succeeds in accomplishing shared understandings at least in routine cases. 
People do not orient to accomplishing intersubjectivity with a specific partner in 
their turn-design, except for cases in which trouble (i.e., misunderstandings, un-
expected responses, repair initiation, etc.) occurs or when acting strategically to 
achieve some persuasive effect or even to deceive (Keysar 2007, 2008).  
Other cognitive researchers claim that experimental data do not sufficiently 
support the hypothesis of the "egocentric speaker" (see Schober/Brennan 2003; 
Brennan et al. 2010). In addition, the ecological validity of socio-cognitive ex-
periments and their generalizability to other interaction types is doubtful in many 
respects: Speakers are faced with restricted possibilities to act, having to put up 
with impoverished sources of knowledge about recipients and being tied to acting 
according to an experimentally predefined agenda of artificial communicative 
tasks. Still, it seems worth considering to which degree speakers recipient-design 
their actions and when, under what conditions and for which uses they fail to take 
common ground, i.e., what they do or could know about the partner's subjective 
state, into account. It is clear that recipient design is always fallible, because it 
rests on the recipient as conceived of by the speaker and not on the factual recipi-
ent. It is also evident that recipient design may attend to different facets of the re-
cipient, so that there are always different possibilities of recipient-designing a turn 
with respect to the same topic or action. Still it remains to be explored in more 
depths whether recipient design is rather ubiquitous, a matter of varying degree or 
the exception to the rule and what the interactional consequences of different 
ways to attend to the recipient in turn-production are. In sum, this paper aims to 
contribute to discovering the phenomenology of egocentric conduct in interaction 
and its empirical and theoretical relevance to the study of intersubjectivity in in-
teraction.  
2. Research questions and data 
The present paper contributes to these issues dealing with properties and conse-
quences of egocentric turn design in naturally occurring interaction, namely, 
driving school lessons. In contrast to psychologists' experimental settings, ego-
centrism here is studied as a phenomenon which occurs in turns produced by a 
participant, the driving school instructor, who is highly entitled to produce a cer-
tain action, i.e. requests, on behalf of his institutional and professional authority. 
Requests are highly routine, recurrent actions in this context. They provide for the 
basic pragmatic structure of driving school interactions. We will deal with the 
following questions:  
• How are driving school instructors' requests recipient-designed? 
• How does egocentrism figure in the turn design of instructors' requests?  
• What are interactional consequences of egocentric turn design? 
• How can sources of turn design be methodologically identified in data from 
naturally occurring interaction? 
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The data to be analyzed stem from a corpus of video-recordings of more than 70 
hours of driving school lessons in Germany (2 instructors, 8 students, 2 cameras 
recording street view and participant view). Three extended request sequences ex-
hibiting properties of instructors' egocentric recipient design which recur through-
out the corpus will be analyzed in detail here.  
For various reasons, driving school lessons are a perspicuous setting (Garfinkel 
2002) for the study of the recipient design. For the purpose of this paper, it is cru-
cial that in driving school lessons, it becomes immediately observable by the stu-
dent's driving actions if and how the student understands the instructor's requests 
and instructions. The student's actions and the car's behavior are direct displays of 
understanding and skill to the instructor (cf. Broth et al. i.pr.). His/her evaluative 
and corrective responses in turn show whether expectations are fulfilled and 
intersubjectivity has been accomplished. This is in contrast to many other types of 
interaction (e.g. narrative interaction), in which it is often not transparent to both 
the teller and the researcher whether recipient design was effective, because there 
are no unambiguous displays of understanding which show that and how the part-
ner orients to the recipient design chosen.  
3. The sequential and multimodal organization of task-performances: 
Counterfactual requests and corrective instructions 
We will start with one complex single case of a complex task-performance. We 
will first show the basic, recurrent sequential and multi-modal structure of the or-
ganization of task-performances in driving school lessons (sect. 3). Then, using 
the same case, we show how the pedagogic and egocentric properties of counter-
factual request design unfold over the trajectory of the task performances (sect. 4).  
Task-performances in driving school are trajectories of instructed actions. They 
are initiated by the instructor setting a complex task which requires from the stu-
dent to perform a series of actions which are needed to complete the task (like 
'turn right at an intersection', 'change lanes', 'reverse park the car'; see De Stefani/ 
Gazin 2014; Deppermann forthc.). The student's task in the case to be analyzed is 
to turn left at the third intersection. Extract #1 consists of the initial, task-setting 
request by the instructor, followed by a series of corrective instructions concern-
ing the student's ongoing task-performance. Finally, the practical completion of 
the task and instructor's accounts and comments concerning the students' actions 
during the previous task-performance close the sequence. 
 
#1 FOLK-Fahrschule 148a, 31:43-32:004 
01 IN:   ich MÖCHte, (0.2) 
         I would like 
02       das ist die ERste ampel, 
         this is the first traffic light 
                                                          
4  Transcripts conform to the transcription convention GAT2 (Couper-Kuhlen/Barth-Weingarten 
2011) with additional multimodal transcription according to Mondada (2014a). References to 
parts of transcripts are labelled "SXX", meaning segments which correspond to an intonation 
phrase each. 
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03       an der DRITten ampel LINKS; 
         at the third traffic light to the left 
04       +%#(1.1)+ 
   in-g: +looks twice at student and left side mirror+ 
   st-g:  %looks ahead------> 
           #fig.1 
 
 
fig.1: Instructor monitors if student monitors traffic 
 which is about to overtake in the left side mirror. 
 
05 in-h: klicks pen twice 
06       +(1.4)+ 
   in-g: +looks into left side mirror+ 
07 IN:   i%ch würde +BLIN%ken, 
         I would indicate 
   in-g:            +looks into left side mirror---> 
   st-g:->%looks at overtaking car% looks ahead---> 
08       (0.9)+ 
   in-g: ---->+ 
09 st-h: %indicates and looks into interior mirror--> 
   in-g: %looks into interior mirror-------> 
10 IN:   ich würde +SCHAL%ten,  
         I would shift 
   in-g: --------->+.....looks into left side mirror---> 
   st-g: ----------------%...looks into left side mirror--> 
11 IN:   (0.4) GUcken, 
               look 
12       +&(0.6)  
   in-g: +looks ahead---------------> 
   st-h:  &shifts to higher gear---> 
13 IN:   BREMsen,+% 
         brake 
   in-g: ------->+ 
   st-h: -------->& 
14 IN:   +!BREM!%sen,+ 
          brake 
   in-g: +looks to the left+ 
   st-g: ------>%.....looks ahead---> 
15       (0.4) 
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16 IN:   +BREM#%sen, 
          brake 
   in-f:      #brakes---> 
   in-g: +looks left, then ahead---> 
   st-g: ----->%looks left, then ahead---> 
17       (1.5)+# 
   in-g: ---->+ 
   CAR   ----->#stops, engine stalls 
18 ST:   %ja. 
          Yes 
   st-g: %turns to IN---> 
19 IN:   ja:- 
         yes 
20       bremsen %und KUPpeln. 
         brake and clutch 
   st-g: ------->% 
 
The instructor's request that the student should turn to the left at the third traffic 
(S01-03) projects a complex task involving a sequence of different, coordinated 
activities. Unlike the first pair-part of an adjacency pair (cf. Schegloff 2007), the 
request does not simply make just one single next action by the student condition-
ally relevant. Rather, it is only one aspect of the expected action, namely, the goal, 
the final move of a series of actions, which is formulated explicitly (Deppermann 
forthc.). In order to produce it, a series of precision-timed, finely coordinated ac-
tions is required from the student. Most importantly, she has to adapt the type, the 
timing and the indexical design of her actions to the locally specific and in part 
permanently changing situation on the road, which is reflexively changed by her 
own actions. This involves taking into account whether other cars are about to 
overtake, attending to changes in the traffic lights and an emerging traffic jam in 
front of the car, monitoring road signs, etc.  
The initial request thus implies an open-ended set of implicit, taken-for-granted 
expectations to be taken into account when producing the requested response 
(Deppermann forthc.; cf. Amerine/Bilmes 1998; Garfinkel 2002; Mondada 
2014b). By its formulation, it presupposes that the student already disposes of the 
knowledge and the practical skills needed for the adequate situated response. This 
crucially implies that the student will self-select a series of not previously speci-
fied actions in order to comply with the request. 
The instructor closely monitors the student's actions, observing when and how 
she performs what is tacitly expected from her. How situated sensitivity of the ac-
tions is required is nicely evidenced by the multi-activity pattern of the instructor's 
monitoring: He shifts repeatedly between monitoring the student's driving activi-
ties and her monitoring the traffic in the mirrors and ahead of her, which enables, 
calls for or blocks certain actions (like indicating, speeding up, braking, changing 
gears etc.). The instructor's gaze constantly moves between the side mirrors 
(which make potential overtaking cars available, S06-08, 10-11), the interior mir-
ror (which shows the distance of the traffic following the car, S09), the road ahead 
(next traffic light, distance to cars ahead, S12-13, 16-17), and the student (S16), 
including monitoring the way she monitors the traffic (S04, cf. fig.1).  
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The instructor's following requests are produced in response to student's fail-
ures to produce actions (at all or in the correct way) which the instructor deems to 
be necessary in order to fulfill the request, given the local traffic situation and its 
emergent changes. Consecutive requests thus are corrective instructions.  
3.1 Corrective instructions 
In this paper, I distinguish between task-setting requests and corrective instruc-
tions. Task-setting requests set complex navigation tasks (cf. De Stefani/ Gazin 
2014). They formulate "what to do" (like parking the car, driving back to the 
driving school, turn left at the next intersection, etc.). Many task-setting requests 
in driving school lessons are basically not different from those which passengers 
might address to drivers in non-pedagogical settings (see Haddington 2013). They 
are to be distinguished from corrective instructions. Corrective instructions are 
dealing with how to perform the task. They presuppose high entitlement of their 
producers and are a constitutive part of pedagogic action (cf. Ekström/Lindwall 
2014; Hindmarsh et al. 2014). They concern the manipulation of the car, asking 
the student to perform or inhibit some driving action. They respond to student's 
failures to produce locally expected steps of task performance. Corrective instruc-
tions may, like in extract #1, follow up on task-setting requests. They adapt the 
initial task-setting request, producing a more granular formulation of the next lo-
cally relevant action to be taken by the student, given the nature of the student's 
failure and its relationship to the local contingencies of the emerging traffic situa-
tion. In extract #1, corrective instructions occur in segments 
• 07: instruction to indicate, i.e., the student should display publicly that she 
wants to change to the left lane; 
• 10: instruction to change gears, i.e. student should gear down in order to 
accelerate as a preparation for changing lanes, because traffic on the left lane 
is running faster than on the right lane; 
• 11: instruction to "look", i.e., check in the left side mirror, whether she may 
change lanes without running into danger, because other cars may be taking 
over; 
• 13-16: three instructions to brake in a row, as the instructor notices in the left 
mirror that a car on the left lane is approaching so fast that it is not advisable 
to shift to the left lane before it; 
• 20: instruction to brake and clutch, because the car had stalled when the in-
structor stopped the car, because the student did not engage the clutch simul-
taneously. 
Corrective instructions have a much higher granularity than the task-setting re-
quest: They explicitly formulate individual steps of the larger sequence which 
were tacitly made relevant by the initial request, and they immediately respond to 
the emerging local contingencies of the student's actions and the changes in the 
traffic situation. The corrective instructions are emergent, local adaptions of the 
recipient design of the initial request: They do not only correct student's actions, 
but they also repair on the action design of the initial request which had revealed 
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itself to be counterfactual. While the initial request by its design tacitly presup-
posed sufficient knowledge to perform the task, corrective instructions are occa-
sioned by the failure of the student to comply with taken-for-granted expectations 
implied by the initial request. Expected individual steps of action now are explic-
itly formulated. However, corrective instructions themselves are also highly in-
dexical. They are formulated as reminders presupposing unproblematic situated 
intelligibility. This is reflexively indexed by their highly elliptical linguistic de-
sign (e.g., lack of object arguments, no directional phrases). E.g. the instructor 
does not formulate if the student has to indicate to the left or to the right (S07), 
which gear she should switch to (S10), where she should look (S11), which brake 
she should use (S13-20). The use of these elliptical and highly indexical construc-
tions makes the instructions recognizable as reminders that actions are due which 
are expected to be already within the student's repertoire of skills and which are 
not in need of further explanation and justification (which consequently are not 
produced). 
In sum, task-performances like those analyzed in this paper are organized ac-
cording to the following sequential pattern (adapted from De Stefani/Gazin 2014): 
1- IN: Request (counterfactual recipient design) 
2- ST: Failure to produce locally expected steps of response 
3- IN: corrective instruction (retrospectively adapted recipient design) 
4- ST: Driving response 
repeat 2-4 until task completion 
5- IN: Final assessment and discussion of task-performance (see extract #3 below) 
4. Counterfactual recipient design:  
Pedagogic vs. egocentric turn design 
4.1 Counterfactual recipient design as a pedagogic practice 
The design of the instructor's task-setting request in extract #1, S01-03 presup-
poses that the student is able comply with the request. However, the student does 
not respond to the request in the way the instructor deems to be correct and he 
makes her correct her driving.5 Still, at least none of the first four corrective 
instructions (S07-13) exhibit any sign of surprise or frustration on the part of the 
instructor, which might have indexed that he really expected the student to pro-
duce the requested response without correction or support from his part. If this 
were the case, the student's failures would lead the teacher to revise his assess-
ment of the student's skills and, consequently, of the adequacy of his recipient de-
sign. The trajectory of task-performance thus suggests that the recipient design of 
the instructor's initial request was strategically counterfactual.  
Counterfactual recipient design is a generic pedagogic strategy. The combination 
of requests informed by counterfactual recipient design and consecutive corrective 
                                                          
5  Let us for now leave it open whether the student does not possess the relevant skills or whether 
she has a different idea than the instructor about how to deal with the task. 
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instructions makes the driving lesson a hybrid interaction type. It combines a test 
established by the initial request6 with a teaching lesson provided by the correc-
tive instructions. Counterfactual recipient design is paradoxical: It positions stu-
dents, who are still learning, as if they were already fully competent drivers. It 
does so as part of the very process of teaching by setting up a test which allows 
diagnosing the student's skills by making them observable in practice and by thus 
creating occasions to correct the student's performance in situ. Pedagogic counter-
factual recipient design deliberately treats the student as someone who already has 
learnt certain skills which, however, the instructor does not expect the student to 
master already routinely and perfectly.7 Counterfactual recipient design uses a 
turn-design which is adequate for a model recipient similar to the "model reader" 
which Umberto Eco considers to be the idealized addressee of literary production 
(Eco 1979: ch.3). Most importantly, as model readers of a literary text are able to 
fill the gaps in a literary text by themselves, using their own knowledge and im-
agination to create coherence (cf. also Iser 1976), the model recipient of counter-
factual pedagogic design is able to activate and use relevant knowledge and skills 
which are needed for a successful performance of the instructed action. The al-
ready-been-learnt and could-have-known character of the skills needed for a com-
petent fulfilment of requests is indexed by the 'reminder'-design of the teacher's 
corrective instructions (see sect. 3) and the student's immediate, unproblematic re-
sponses to them in extract #1. Pedagogic counterfactual recipient design is used in 
order to elicit students' responses as information about who s/he "really is", i.e. 
which skills s/he already may reliably enact and which skills are still unstable and 
in need of practice. Pedagogic counterfactual recipient design therefore is an in-
teractional practice of counterfactual other-positioning which is used to find out 
who the recipient relevantly is with respect to the precise exigencies of the task to 
be learnt.  
The combination of a counterfactual request with subsequent corrections situ-
ates the driving lesson in a "zone of proximal development" (cf. Vygotsky 1978): 
The instructor's initial request sets a goal which the student is to orient to in her 
own actions, i.e. it projects the model driver which the student is to become, but 
which she is not yet. The instructor supports her by monitoring her actions, by 
providing corrective instructions for initiating and rectifying local actions and by 
active interventions from his part (like braking, later also: speeding up, grasping 
the steering wheel). The instructor's actions resemble scaffolding activities 
(Ninio/Bruner 1978): The skills to be finally acquired by the student as her indi-
vidual competencies are first realized in coordinated interpersonal practice led by 
the more experienced participant. The cooperative performance of the actions 
which the instructor expects replaces individual actions of the student whenever 
her actions do not match the standards which the instructor holds to be in place.  
                                                          
6  By clicking his pen twice after his sequence-opening request (#1, S05), the instructor assumes 
an examiner’s stance, displaying that he is ready to note any occurring problem. 
7  The student is not yet close to the driving school exam, i.e. neither the instructor nor the stu-
dent regard her as a possibly fully competent driver at this point. The lesson from which the 
extract is taken was not framed as a simulation of the final driving school exam. 
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4.2  Counterfactuality of recipient design resulting 
from egocentric presuppositions 
Pedagogic counterfactuality of recipient design is deliberately used to test the stu-
dent's skills and to identify student's needs for improvement and learning validly 
under real-world conditions. The instructor, however, also can be seen to make 
another kind of presuppositions which may be more adequately termed "egocen-
tric". These presuppositions do not seem to be strategically counterfactual, but in-
advertently so: The instructor presupposes bits of his private knowledge to be part 
of the common ground shared with the student which, as turns out in the interac-
tional sequence, the student effectively does not share. These egocentric, non-
shared presuppositions create problems of intersubjective cooperation, because 
they imply tacit expectations of how the student should comply with the instruc-
tor's requests, which, however, are opaque and inaccessible to the student. The 
kinds of knowledge and perspectives which are egocentrically presupposed by the 
instructor are 
• knowledge about expectable problematic traffic conditions which are likely to 
be encountered at certain future points of the planned trajectory (see extract 
#3),  
• the instructor's driving preferences (see extract #3 and 7), and 
• topographic knowledge about the (not-yet-visible) course of the road (see ex-
tracts #7 and #9). 
5. Interactional consequences of egocentric turn-design:  
Breakdown of intersubjective cooperation 
If egocentric turn-design involves expectations concerning the recipient's actions 
which the recipient cannot recover, intersubjective cooperation and reciprocal co-
ordination with respect to the shared joint project break down. In extract #2, we 
see how the student is no longer able to contribute to the joint project of turning 
left at the third intersection, because she does not understand the rationale of the 
instructor's corrective instructions and even considers them to be illegitimate.  
 
#2 FOLK-Fahrschule 148a, 32:00-32:27 
21       (0.4)%(2.2)   
   st-h:      %starts engine, grasps steering wheel 
   st-g:      %looks ahead, then turns to left side mirror---->  
22 IN:   %BREMsen; 
   CAR:  %starts to move 
23       (0.4)  
24 ST:   <<h>wieSO: denn.> 
             but why? 
25 IN:   weil dU WECHseln +möch[test]  
         because you like to change 
   in-f:                  +brakes 
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26 ST:                         [was?]# 
                                what? 
                                     #fig.1 
27 IN:   und du das ANgekündigt hast. 
         and you have announced it 
28 IN:   =bleib STEHN- 
          stay! 
29       (6.0)  
30 IN:   SIEHST du?=  
         you see? 
31       =selbst der BUSfahrer pennt. 
          even the bus driver is sleeping 
32       (0.9)  
33 IN:   deswegen bleiben wir hier STEHN.  
         therefore we stay here  
34       WIR wArten hier.  
         we wait here 
35       wir haben !LUFT! ge[schaf]fen; 
         we have created clearance 
36 ST:                      [aber,] 
                             but 
37 ST:   KANN ich das ein%[fach hier,]# 
         can I simply here 
   st-h:                 %points to street ahead 
38 IN:                    [das: (.)  ] SEHST du doch; 
                           but you see it 
                                      #fig.2 
39 IN:   da meckert keener,=  
         nobody complains 
40       =das problem ist+#nur DA die+ durchgezogene LInie.  
           the problem is only the solid line 
   in-h:  ...............+points to street ahead+,,,,,,,, 
                          #fig.3 
41       (.) °hh und wenn wir das !NOCH! später machen-=  
                 and if we do it even later 
42       =dann hast du !GAR! keine chanse. 
          then you have absolutely no chance 
After the instructor braked and stopped the car, the student starts the engine again 
and sets the car in motion (S21). The instructor, however, again asks her to brake 
(S22) and makes the car stop again (S25). The student, with an irritated voice, 
displays non-understanding of this move, requesting an account from the instruc-
tor for why she should brake again (S24). The instructor answers: weil dU 
WECHseln möchtest ('because you would like to change', S25).8 However, this ac-
count obviously does not help the student to understand the reasons for the in-
structor's action and what he expects her to do. Her open class repair initiator 
                                                          
8  The instructor here refers to the plan to change to the left lane. Why this is an account for the 
command to keep the car stopped, becomes clear only in S40-42 (see below). 
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was? (S26; cf. Drew 1997) and her facial expression (slightly frowning, mouth 
opened, see fig.2) display unresolved non-understanding.  
 
fig.2: ST: "was?" ('what'), frowning, mouth open 
While the car stays in place, the instructor declares that they wait because of the 
overtaking cars (S30-35). The student, however, does not understand why she 
should stay in place (instead of moving on down the right lane); moreover, she 
doubts that she is allowed to just stop the car at this place (S36f.). Her pointing 
gesture to the street ahead (see fig.2) seems to index that she assumes that it is not 
allowed to stop the car leaving more than 10 meters space to the next car in front 
of her which is waiting for the traffic lights to turn green, and risking to cause a 
traffic jam behind her, which, indeed, is about to develop.  
 
 
 
fig.3: ST: "KANN ich das einfach hier", 'can I simply here', 
points to space ahead of the car 
It is only now that the instructor accounts for his actions, referring to the solid line 
as a normative reason for the place chosen to stop (S40-42, fig.4).  
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fig.4: IN: "das problem ist nur DA die durchgezogene LInie."‚ the problem is only the 
solid line', points to the solid line separating left and right lane 
The instructor does not clearly state, but only lets infer that he wants the student to 
change lanes before the solid line, because they will not have a chance to change 
lanes later. Why this should be so, remains unexplained. There is no indication 
from the student, either, that she has understood how and why the solid line is 
normatively relevant for how the instructor expects her to perform the task of 
changing to the left lane. Like in extract #1, the student fails to produce expected 
actions self-initiatedly. However, in contrast to extract #1, where corrective in-
structions were followed unproblematically without delay, in extract #2, even 
upon corrective instructions, the student does not understand why she should pro-
duce expected actions and she even deems them to be illegitimate. The instructor's 
counterfactual expectations obviously did not concern situated expectations about 
performing already-been-learnt and could-have-known skills, but they proved to 
be egocentric and unrecoverable for the student. Still, that the student does not act 
the way the instructor expects does not mean that the student does not have the 
relevant skills or is not able to practice them in situ. The student's failure to brake 
and clutch becomes only a failure against the background of the teacher's tacit, 
rigid expectation that they have to change lanes before the solid line, whereas 
driving straight further down the right lane would be perfectly well if one wants to 
change lanes only after the second traffic light, as the student seems to intend. It is 
thus only if one compares the student's actions to a rigid driving plan which is dif-
ferent from hers that her actions seem incompetent. The egocentric turn-design of 
the instructor has created an opaque action environment, selecting the relevance to 
change lanes before the solid line as an arbitrarily chosen absolute criterion which 
is unnegotiable. This implies a high probability for the student to fail and which 
discourages the student to deploy the skills she possesses, because all actions 
which do not conform to the instructor's plan are rejected. 
In the further course of the joint project of turning left at the third intersection 
following extract #2, the student acts increasingly insecure and reacts only with 
much delay, if at all. This causes additional trouble: she misses the first chance to 
change lanes quickly enough, and at the second occasion, her manoeuver is so 
slow that the instructor intervenes by grasping the steering wheel and speeding the 
car up. The student's increasing incapability to act according to the teacher's ex-
pectations arises from the failure to infer how he expects her to perform the task 
of turning left at the third intersection. This failure directly plays out as puzzle-
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ment about what to do next. The student's (in-)action is finally responded to by a 
series of harsh criticisms by the instructor.  
It is only some two minutes later when they have arrived at the third traffic 
light and the task is about to be completed that in the concluding assessment and 
discussion of the task-performance, the instructor explains why he wanted the stu-
dent to change lanes at the earliest moment possible (and not only after the second 
traffic light) and why he wanted her to stop the car. The instructor argues that he 
thought it would have become more difficult to change lanes at a later point be-
cause of the heavy traffic to be expected after the second traffic light.  
#3 FOLK-Fahrschule 148a, 33:46-33:59 
104 IN: wenn man sich hier AUSkennt,=  
        if you know the site 
105      =WEISS man dass das hier SEHR sEhr eng ist,  
         you know that it is very very tight here 
106     °h und wir haben STOßverkehr zur zeit-  
           and there is heavy traffic right now 
107     du siehst dass_s hier überall DICHT,  
        you see that it’s all packed here 
108     °h un wEnn ich schon einmal steh dann bleibe ich stehen 
und  
        <<len>!WA:R!te,  
        and if I have already stopped once then I stay and wait 
109     (0.4) und WARten,  
              and to wait 
110     <<all>hab ich ja immer gesagt-> 
               I have always said it 
111     ist GEnial-  
        is perfect 
112     °h und da kann mir !NICHTS! passieren;  
            then nothing can happen to you 
The instructor now explicitly refers to prior experience (wenn man sich hier aus-
kennt, 'if you know the site') as grounds for his driving preferences. This, how-
ever, is the instructor's private knowledge, which he uses for anticipatory planning 
of actions, but it obviously has not been available to the student. Thus, tacitly pre-
supposing that the student takes this knowledge into account for the design of ex-
pected actions inevitably leads to cooperation problems and breakdowns of inter-
subjectivity. Breakdowns concern both the unrecoverablility of the partner's ex-
pectations and action plan and the unintelligibility of the partner's actions (their 
reasons and functionalities). The instructor additionally states a rule of thumb 
(warten (…) ist genial, 'waiting (…) is perfect'), which is to account for his pref-
erence to keep the car stopped, although this causes other cars to wait. The student 
also did not seem to be able to relate this rule, which the instructor treats as com-
mon ground (hab ich ja immer gesagt, 'I have always said it'), to the relevancies of 
the current task-performance.  
The instructor concludes his discussion of the task-performance with a moral 
assessment of the student's failures.  
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#4 FOLK-Fahrschule 148a, 34:00-34:14 
113 IN: °h nur wenn man dann kollaBIERT,  
           but if one collapses in this situation 
114     so wie DU grade,  
        as you just did 
115     °h dann geht !GAR! nix-  
           then nothing works 
116     und wenn man dann LOS fahren will  
        wo man noch gar nicht losfahren DARF,  
        and if you want to start where you’re not allowed to start 
117     °h weil die Andern es dir nicht geZEIGT haben- 
           because the others did not show you 
118     (0.5) dann,  
              then 
119     (0.3) COOL bleiben sagt man immer so schön;  
              stay cool    as people say 
120     (0.5) JA?  
              yes 
121     (0.4) und das WARst_e nich; 
              and this is what you were not 
The instructor ascribes the failure to comply as expected to the student as a mor-
ally implicative, personal fault. He claims that she had "kollabiert" ('collapsed', 
S113f.) and did not stay "cool" (S119-121). The instructor warrants his negative 
moral evaluation of the student reference to the student's deviation from norms of 
proper driving which he states.  
Cooperation problems resulting from failures to accomplish intersubjectivity 
with respect to expected actions are unilaterally ascribed as symptoms of incom-
petence to just one of the participants involved. Interactional effects resulting 
from egocentric turn-design and asymmetries in knowledge and preferences are 
finally interpreted in terms of other-positioning the student as being incompetent, 
i.e. a degradation of her status as a rational actor. 
Over extracts #1 and #2 we could observe an increasing breakdown of inter-
subjective cooperation. It began with the absence of expected actions by the 
student, was followed by the student's non-understanding of why she should pro-
duce these actions and finally led to the student's doubt whether expected actions 
are actually legitimate. The increasing problems of the student to recover the in-
structor's expectations and the reasons for his corrective instructions finally led to 
a breakdown of her own action orientation as evidenced by delayed action and in-
action. The breakdown of intersubjectivity seems to imply the student loses her 
trust in being able to contribute to cooperative action in an acceptable way, lead-
ing to reduced involvement, which itself increases the breakdown of intersubjec-
tive cooperation.  
Only starting with S25 in extract #2 the instructor began to formulate bits of 
non-shared knowledge and driving preferences which accounted for his expecta-
tions. However, sufficient transparency was only achieved after the fact, i.e. after 
the student had repeatedly missed expected steps of the task performance and the 
relevant actions had finally been carried out by the instructor himself. We could 
see that the following egocentric assumptions informed the instructor's expecta-
tions about how and why to comply with requests and corrective instructions:  
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• topographic knowledge: knowledge about the not-yet-visible course of the 
road,  
• prior experience concerning problematic traffic conditions (jams) which are 
likely to be encountered and which should be avoided by anticipatory driving 
choices, 
• driving preferences which the student considers to be dis-preferred or even 
forbidden (here: leaving more than 10 meters space and waiting in front of 
green traffic lights in order to change lanes before the solid line and risking to 
cause a traffic jam is better than driving straight on and risking to get caught 
in a traffic jam).  
The detrimental effects of egocentric turn-design on intersubjective cooperation 
become further aggravated, because other resources which could help to restore 
intersubjectivity are not used, either. Driving preferences, action plans and stand-
ards of correct task-performance are unilaterally enforced by the teacher, remain-
ing opaque to the student. The instructor offers no opportunity for negotiating 
how the task is to be solved collaboratively and how to account for individual 
steps of action. Even in the face of the student's repeated failures to comply with 
the instructor's expectations, he does neither try to check the student's plan about 
how to manage the task, which obviously differs from the instructor's concept, nor 
does he account more explicitly and comprehensively for the choices he expects 
the student to make. The student's questions deemed to restore intersubjectivity 
are responded to rather fragmentarily, obviously not leading to sufficient under-
standing on her part (see extract #2, S24-26 and S36f.). The instructor does not 
check whether the student finally has understood his choices and the presupposi-
tions they rest on. The student herself also does not produce any understanding 
displays during the lengthy concluding discussion of the prior task-performance. 
In sum, egocentric turn design and its effects are intimately tied to interactional 
asymmetries in deontic and epistemic rights and duties in this episode:  
• The instructor claims asymmetric deontic rights (cf. Stevanovic/Peräkylä 
2012) in defining standards of correct task-performance exclusively by him-
self. 
• The instructor assigns the epistemic duty (Stivers et al. 2011) to the student to 
strive to understand the instructor's perspective, whereas he himself cooper-
ates only in a very partial and delayed fashion in securing the student's under-
standings of his actions. In contrast, the instructor neither tries to understand 
the student's perspective - he only devaluates it -, nor does the student try to 
account for her own perspective in order to make it transparent to the teacher.  
6. Extending the analysis:  
Misunderstood and non-understood expectations as a source of 
breakdowns of cooperation  
In order to give an idea of recurrent sources of egocentric turn design and how it 
systematically affects intersubjective cooperation, we will turn to two other cases 
of egocentric expectations about how to comply with a request. In these cases, the 
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student is not able to contribute expected actions because of misunderstandings 
and non-understandings of non-shared expectations. 
6.1  Misunderstandings:  
Egocentric turn design leading to a wrong expectation 
concerning task performance 
Egocentric turn design may lead the respondent to comply with a request in a way 
which runs counter to the non-shared requester's expectations. In the next case, the 
instructor rejects the way the student responds to his request. From the point of 
view of the student, the rejection seems to contradict the initial request and the 
student is not able to contribute to a common joint project anymore.  
The task-setting request 
When crossing an intersection, the student did not mind that driving on straight 
made him enter a dead-end street. Students in driving school have to avoid this 
unless explicitly being requested to. After the instructor has made the student re-
cognize his fault (S01-08), the instructor requests him to leave the dead-end street 
(S09-12). 
#5 FOLK-Fahrschule 13.09.2012, 142a: 7:04-7:16  
01 IN:   MEINST du dass das richtig war;  
         do you think this was right? 
02 ST:   (0.2) hm_hm.  
03 IN:   (0.4) ((dental click)) (0.25) 
04 IN:   JA oder nein;  
         yes or no? 
05 ST:   (0.2) NEIN weil da-  
               no because there 
06       (0.6) KOMM da nicht dursch.  
               I won’t get through 
07       (0.6)  
08 IN:   R:ICHtig;  
         right 
09       und JETZT,  
         and now 
10       sieh ZU:,  
         see 
11       (0.2) das is dann DEIne aufgabe,  
               this is your task then 
12       wie DU da raus kommst.  
         how you manage to get out there 
When instructors use the imperative in driving school lessons, this usually indexes 
that the requested action is immediately due (Deppermann forthc.; cf. Antaki/Kent 
2012; Mondada 2011, 2013; Vine 2009 for other interaction types). The instruc-
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tor's imperative-formatted request JETZT, sieh ZU:, (0.2) das is dann DEIne auf-
gabe, wie DU da raus kommst. ('now see this is your task then how you manage to 
get out there', S09-12) thus leads the student to assume that he is expected to turn 
around as soon as possible in order to exit the dead-end street as quick as he can. 
In addition to the imperative, the need for immediate action is further indexed by 
the stressed temporal deictic "JETZT" (now, S09). An immediate turn-around also 
seems fair because driving further down the dead-end street would mean to carry 
on with the faulty action.  
Interactional consequence: cooperation problems  
After his request, the instructor reminds the student that he has to enter dead-end 
streets only when being told to do so (omitted in the transcript). In the following, 
the student orients to using the next possible occasion to turn, while the instructor 
urges him to drive further down the dead-end street.  
#6 FOLK-Fahrschule 13.09.2012, 142a: 7:24-7:52  
18       §(3.3)§+  
   st-h: §starts to turn left§ 
   in-f:        +brakes 
19 IN:   +so pass AUF;+  
          now pay attention 
   in-h: +looks to the left, raises pen+  
20       +(0.3) 
   in-h: +bends forward to the left, points with pen to the left-> 
21 IN:   *§da sind sie VOLL an ar*beiten,§* 
           there they are busy working 
   in-h: ----------------------->*,,,,,,,* 
   st-g: §looks to the left§ 
22 IN:   °h +und das ist +§STRESS pur.  
             and this is sheer stress 
   in-h: +horizontal move with right hand to the left and back+ 
23 IN:   (0.3) fahr doch +erstmal WEIter; 
               drive on for now 
   in-h: ................+points ahead with pen---> 
24       (0.5)+(2.0) 
   in-h: ---->+,,, 
25       §(1.2) 
   CAR:  §starts to move---->>   
26 IN:   UND,  
         and 
27 IN:   (0.2) du +wach machst alles Ohne sich ohne sicherung,  
               you do it all without checking 
   in-h: .........+points at left exterior mirror,,,,,,,,,  
28 IN:   NÄMlich (.) das falsche blinken.=  
         that is to say the wrong indicating 
29       =so gib +!GAS!; 
          now speed up 
   in-h: ........+points ahead with pen,,, 
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30 IN:   (0.5) gib GAS,  
               speed up 
31 ST:   [ich wollte] HIER [fahren;] 
          I wanted to drive here 
32 IN:   [gib GAS,  ]      
          speed up 
33 IN:                     [gib    ]GAS, 
                            speed up 
34 IN:   ich WEISS was du wolltest;  
         I know what you wanted 
35       gib GAS;  
         speed up 
36       (1.2)+ 
   in-h:      +hits with pen at the right window 
37 IN:   das ist doch Alles viel zu eng.  
         this is all much too narrow 
38 IN:   (0.6) so,=und jetzt GUCK mal da,  
               so  and now look there 
39       (1.5)  
40 IN:   gib GA:S,  
         speed up 
41       und fahr WEIter,  
         and drive on 
Immediately after the instructor's account, the student slows down and starts to 
turn left in order to enter a yard and to reverse the car (S18). The instructor, how-
ever, stops the car by operating the brake (S18). He tells the student not to enter 
the yard, because there are road-works going on, but to drive straight on instead 
(S19-23). The student drives on (S25), but very slowly, looking for the next op-
portunity to reverse the car. The instructor, however, recurrently insists that the 
student speeds up and drives straight on (S29, 30, 32, 33, 40, 41). The student 
starts to account for his driving intentions (ich wollte hier fahren, 'I wanted to 
drive here', S31). The instructor, however, does not cede the turn to the student, 
but claims to know the student's intentions and rejects their relevance insisting on 
his request to speed up (S32-35). Again, he accounts for his refusal of the stu-
dent's initiatives by referring to unfavorable road conditions (das ist doch Alles 
viel zu eng, 'this is all much to narrow', S37).  
In the extract, a profound failure of intersubjectivity becomes increasingly evi-
dent. The student's and the instructor's orientations have different orientations 
concerning how to deal with the task of having to leave the dead-end street and 
which visible and non-visible aspects of the road are relevant for a correct solu-
tion of the task. This creates an extended cooperation problem: While the student 
organizes his driving in order to use the next opportunity to turn, just as had been 
requested by the instructor in S09-12, the latter discards all available opportunities 
as unfavorable. The student, however, stays with his orientation to driving slowly 
in order to scan the road for places to turn, obviously, because he orients to the 
immediacy of the need to exit the street and because he sees no alternative to his 
searching procedure. The student's action initiatives are rejected by the instructor, 
but he is not able to infer the instructor's plan. Consequently, no shared intersub-
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jective orientation to how the task is to be solved gets accomplished. The instruc-
tor neither states positively how the task should be solved nor does he let the stu-
dent explain his own plan and enter into a negotiation about how to comply with 
the request satisfactorily. 
Egocentric presuppositions: Topographic knowledge and driving preferences 
The instructor makes his plan how to solve the task only explicit when the place 
gets into sight which the instructor deems suitable for turning the car.  
#6 FOLK-Fahrschule 13.09.2012, 142a: 7:54-8:00 
43 IN: so und jetzt siehst du #+DA eine schöne einmündende strAße; 
       so and now there you see a nice connecting street  
   in-h: .........................+points ahead with pen,,,,,,, 
                              #fig.5 
44 ST: n_JA- 
       yes 
45 IN: da fährst du L:INKS rein;  
       there you turn left 
It turns out that the dead-end street they are driving down intersects with another 
minor street, which was not visible when the teacher produced his request to exit 
from the dead-end street and when the student attempted to reverse the car.  
 
fig.5: IN: "so,=und jetzt siehst du DA eine schöne einmündende strAße;", 
'so and now there you see a nice connecting street'. 
IN points forward; the connecting street to the left is not visible yet. 
Obviously, the instructor had in mind from the beginning that the student should 
use the connecting street to turn the car. However, the student neither seemed to 
know of this street nor did the instructor assume the student to do so. He uses an 
indefinite description eine schöne einmündende strAße ('a nice connecting street', 
S042) to refer to the place to turn. The indefinite article eine ('a') indexes that the 
instructor supposes this to be new, previously unknown information (cf. Gundel et 
al. 1993) to the student. The indefinite reference and the fact that it is produced, 
when the street is still barely visible to the participants, give evidence that his re-
jections of the student's initiatives to turn have rested on his private topological 
knowledge about more favorable opportunities for turning. This knowledge about 
the course of the road was obviously not shared by the student. Therefore, the stu-
dent was not able to recover the instructor's plan how to solve the task and thus 
could not cooperate in task-solving as expected by the instructor. Being short of 
shared prior knowledge, the student could only understand the instructor's dis-
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crepant orientation to task-solving when he could see the opportunity to turn 
which the instructor had known in advance. 
As the car has turned and they are on their way out of the dead-end street, in 
the concluding discussion of the task-performance the instructor discloses his 
driving preferences.  
#7 FOLK-Fahrschule 13.09.2012, 142a: 8:48-9:07  
104 IN:   SU(chen sie) sich mal ne geeignete stelle.  
          just look for an appropriate place 
105       aber DAS waren alles,  
          but these were all 
106       (0.5)  
107 IN:   !STRESS! (.) stellen;  
           stress      places 
108       naTÜRlich geht das,  
          of course this is possible 
109       Aber, (.) 
          but 
110       ich mach das doch nicht wenn da die leute ARbeiten. 
          I don’t do it if people are working there 
111       °hh und WENN,  
              and if 
112       (0.4)  
113 IN:   mach ich das IMmer, (0.2)rückwärts RECHTS;  
          I always do it like reverse right 
114       sodass ich !DANN!,  
          so that I then 
115       (0.5)  
116 IN:   °h ((clears throat))  
117       der BLINker fehlt.  
          the indicator is missing 
118       (1.0)  
119 IN:   sodass ich !DANN!?  
          so that I then 
120       (0.5)  
121 IN:   wenn ich da (0.4) RUMfahre, 
          if I turn 
122       nur !EI!nen fahrstreifen kreuze;  
          cross only one lane 
123       und NICHT (.) zwei.  
          and not two 
The instructor concedes that the student's initiatives and i.e. his plan how to solve 
the task were not incorrect (naTÜRlich geht das, 'of course this is possible', S108). 
He now makes his driving preferences explicit which he had tacitly presupposed 
when rejecting the student's initiatives: He would avoid stressful places to turn, 
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where people are working, and when turning around (using a yard), he would do it 
by reversing to the right, but not by first crossing the street.  
The student finally learns that his initiatives which the instructor had blocked 
were not wrong in principle, but not preferred from the instructor's point of view 
for reasons of safety and ease of driving. It is thus only after the fact that the pre-
cise nature of the rupture of intersubjectivity between the participants' expecta-
tions becomes clearer: It is not that the student had simply tried to comply with 
the request in an inacceptable way – as the recurrent outright rejections of his ac-
tions by the instructor would have suggested -, but the instructor expected him to 
use a more convenient and safer opportunity to turn. Because of his restricted 
knowledge of the course of the road, the student could not guess that such an op-
portunity existed. 
When producing his requests, the instructor presupposes non-shared 
knowledge about topographic particulars and driving preferences for how he ex-
pects the student to complete the task. Intersubjectivity breaks down because the 
student is unable to recover the instructor's tacit expectations. While the instructor 
bases his expectations on what he knows in advance, the student can only account 
for the instructor's expectations after the fact, i.e., when he sees that the dead-end 
street finally intersects with another street. From the student's point of view, the 
instructor's recurrent instructions urge him to continue a line of action which is 
obviously in contrast to what is requested. The apparent contradiction between the 
instructor's initial task-setting request and his later instructions is increased by the 
instructor using the imperative in his initial request, thus erroneously contextual-
izing the urgent need to comply immediately. These contradicting demands on the 
student's action lead to a breakdown of cooperation, because the student's own ac-
tion plan and his attempts at accounting are rejected, but no intelligible alternative 
is provided by the instructor. Instead, the instructor's later imperatives ("gib gas", 
'speed up') ask for "blind" compliance, solely by virtue of the instructor' entitle-
ment to command, without providing an account which makes the instructions 
intelligible for the student. 
6.2  Non-understandings: Egocentric turn design leading to 
puzzlement concerning expected task performance 
An intransparent instruction and its interactional consequences  
Immediately after turning into a new street, the instructor asks the student three 
times to look at the ground. While it is clear that this request implies the need for 
some driving action, the student does not understand which action is expected 
from her.  
#8 FOLK-Fahrschule "guck auf_n boden", 18.09.2012, 148a: 20:00-20:15  
01 IN:   +§guck auf_n BOden;+  
           look at the ground 
   in-h: +points to right lane ahead+  
   st-g:  §looks at street ahead---->  
02 IN:   #guck auf_n BOden,  
          look at the ground 
         #fig.6 
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03       (1.2) 
04 IN:   guck auf_n !BO!den? 
         look at the ground 
05       (0.5) 
06 ST:   h_nä,  
         uh? 
07       (0.5)  
   st-h: #moves fingers to indicator---->  
08 IN:   JA,  
         yes 
09       (0.4)+(0.5) 
   in-g:      +looks at ST’s fingers---->  
10 IN:   JA,  
11       (0.2)+(0.4)  
   in-f:      +prepares to brake->   
   in-g:      +looks ahead----->  
12 ST:   §RÜber?§  
          to the other lane? 
   st-g: §looks at IN§  
13       +(1.3)+§  
   in-f: +brakes+ 
   CAR:         §stops 
14 IN:   [((dental click))] 
15 ST:   [hm              ] 
16 IN:   WAS haben wir §im unterricht immer gesagt; 
         what have we always said in the lessons? 
   st-g:               §frowns-------------------->  
18       +(1.4) 
   in-g: +gaze at ST---->  
19 IN:   wir müssen IMmer,  
         we always have to 
20       (0.2)§(1.0)§ 
   st-g:      §looks at interior mirror§ 
21 ST:   §äht #was+ 
          erm what?  
   st-g: §looks ahead----> 
   st-h:      #shakes head slightly----> 
22 ST:   ich weiss jetzt ECHT nicht was du-  
         I really don’t know what you 
By saying guck auf den boden ('look at the ground', S01-04), the instructor ex-
pects the student to infer that she should inspect the road markings on the street 
and to infer from them which lane she has to take. Fig.6 shows the street view as 
the car just is entering the new street on the right lane. Its road marking obliges 
cars driving on this lane to turn right at the next intersection.  
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fig.6: Street view just after having entered the new street 
In driving school there is a rule which is well-known to students requiring them to 
head on straight beyond an intersection if the instructor does not require them to 
do differently. This holds except for cases where driving straight would lead into a 
dead-end street or into private property. Then the student has to turn right. The in-
structor's request to look at the ground thus invites the student to remember, by 
discovering the road markings, this rule and to decide whether she may drive 
straight on, which would make it necessary to change to the left lane, or whether 
she may not, thus having to stay on the right lane in order to turn right. The stu-
dent first does not overtly react to the instructor's request (S03), after its second 
repetition (S04), she produces a repair-initiator (S06) and moves her fingers to the 
indicator (S07), showing that she infers that the instructor means her change lanes, 
and asks for confirmation of this action (S12). The series of her reactions suggests 
that she first saw no need to consider changing lanes and did not figure out for 
which reasons she should do so. Fig.6 shows that when the instructor produced his 
request for the first time, there was no need for an immediate change of lanes, be-
cause there was still enough time and no competing traffic. Only since the in-
structor repeatedly insisted on his request, she concluded that she was expected to 
change lanes, because this was the most plausible account for the lingering rele-
vance of the request. The instructor, however, does not confirm her move. Instead, 
he brakes and stops the car (S13) in order to initiate a knowledge checking se-
quence starting in S16. He does not treat the student's initiative as a display of 
competent knowledge how to deal with the task of selecting the right lane, proba-
bly seeing it only as an reaction occasioned by his repeated problem-implicative 
request, which let her infer that her own choice must have been wrong, however, 
without understanding why. The student reacts puzzled, displaying by a frowning 
face, repair-initiations and head shake (S20-21) that she does not understand what 
the instructor expects from her.  
Egocentric presupposition 
Over the course of the knowledge check, it turns out that the instructor knew that 
the street continues beyond the next intersection. The student, however, did nei-
ther know this, nor was she able to see it when the instructor's requests were pro-
duced (cf. fig.4 above). 
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#9 FOLK-Fahrschule "guck auf_n boden", 18.09.2012, 148a: 20:15-20:35  
23 IN:   °HHHH KÖNnen wir gradeaus fahren? 
               can we drive straight on 
24       (0.7)  
25 ST:   NEIN.  
         no 
26 IN:   (0.2) DOCH.  
               of course! 
27 IN:   können wir WOHL;  
         sure we can    
28       (0.5)  
29 ST:   is_das ne <<pp>STRAße;> 
         is this a street? 
30       (0.5)  
31 ST:   JA- 
         yes? 
32       (0.6)  
33 IN:   [und DA] müssen wir hin; 
          and that’s where we have to get to 
34 ST:   [also  ] 
          so 
35       (0.5)  
36 ST:   also FAHRstreifen+wechsel;  
         so (it’s) change of lane 
   in-g:                  +nods 
37 IN:   JA,  
         yes 
38       und DEN hättest du vorher schon sehen könn,=  
         and you could have seen this already before   
39       =wenn du da WEIT genug reinguckst,  
          if you look far enough into it 
40       (.) UND,  
            and 
41       soBALD du es erkennst,  
         as soon as you recognize it 
42       das ABänderst.  
         you change 
43       °h du fährst einfach STUPF auf der rechten seite-=  
            you just drive PRT on the right side 
44       =und dat GEHT nicht;  
          and this doesn’t work 
45       du musst WEIter gucken was da auf der straße is,  
         you must look further what there is on the street 
As the instructor asks the student if she is allowed to drive straight on (S23), she 
denies (S25) and accounts for this by her question is das ne straße ('is this a 
street', S29), indexing that she did not recognize the continuation of the road as a 
public street. The instructor confirms this in S33 by instructing the student that 
they have to take this street. As an inference from this, the student now formulates 
explicitly the expected solution to the initial task-setting request: also FAHR-
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streifenwechsel ('so (it's) change of lane', S36). The instructor confirms (S37), 
reproaching the student that she should have seen this before and reacted 
accordingly (S38-45). Both the student's question in S29 and the street view of the 
camera recordings (see fig.6), however, suggest that the student could not identify 
whether the road would continue as a public street beyond the intersection. In ad-
dition, the instructor's request to look at the ground (see #8, S01-04) contradicts 
his later criticism "DEN hättest du vorher schon sehen könn_n,=wenn du da 
WEIT genug reinguckst," ('you could have seen this already before if you look far 
enough into it', #9, S38f), because looking both directly in front of the car and far 
ahead beyond the intersection does not seem to be feasible at the same time. The 
instructor equates his prior knowledge about the local topography of the course of 
the street with what the student could have seen, treating it as common ground to 
be taken into account when complying with his initial request. However, for the 
student, the course of the road beyond the intersection is not immediately visible, 
and even less so as she is asked to look at the ground. The student could have 
acted the way the instructor expected her to only, if she had the same knowledge 
about the local topography of the street as he. As in the two other cases discussed 
above, the instructor's request (in #8, S01-04) was egocentrically designed, tacitly 
expecting the student to take non-shared topographic knowledge into account for 
correct task-performance. The student's failure to comply with the request as ex-
pected resulted from a lack of shared topographic knowledge, which she could not 
compensate for by visual access. The student's failure to comply with the task as 
expected thus did not reflect a lack of driving competencies (here: lack of 
knowledge about rules for lane selection or lack of anticipatory driving). Still, the 
instructor treats it as a morally accountable failure due to insufficient monitoring 
of the course of the road.  
7. Discussion 
This study is a plea for more detailed studies of practices and properties of recipi-
ent design and their significance for the organization of social interaction. It aims 
to contribute to the study of recipient design by showing how turn design reflects 
presumptions of situated intersubjectivity-1 and how this matters to the interac-
tional achievement of intersubjectivity-2. In particular, we have seen how counter-
factual turn design figures in request sequences, taking extended interactional 
task-performances from driving school lessons as the empirical case. The main 
findings of the paper are: 
(1) Request sequences in driving school lessons start with counterfactual, peda-
gogic requests which treat the student as if s/he was already able to comply 
with the request competently. Counterfactual pedagogic expectations concern 
bits of knowledge which have an already-been-learnt, should-have-known or 
could-be-known status for the student. 
(2) Requests imply numerous taken-for-granted expectations concerning re-
quested responses, e.g. regarding steps of actions to be taken, sequencing, 
timing and situated design of expected next actions and their adaption to 
changing situational contingencies of the moving car and the traffic condi-
tions.   
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(3) Counterfactual positioning the student as already being competent by the re-
quest is used to test and train the student's skills in situ, allowing to correct on 
his/her failures in real-time, authentic task-performance. There is a recurrent, 
routine sequential pattern of task-performances, which includes that the in-
structor continuously monitors the student's task-performance, reacting to fail-
ures to produce expected actions by corrective instructions until the task is 
completed. 
(4) Counterfactual turn design is a case of counterfactual other-positioning per-
formed in order to make the recipient reveal him/herself who s/he really is 
(with respect to exigencies of the task at hand). It is thus rather a strategic, 
productive interactional practice and not so much a practice which reflects the 
speaker's partner model of the recipient. 
(5) At least in principle, counterfactual, pedagogic turn-design is to be distin-
guished from counterfactual, egocentric turn design. The latter involves non-
shared private knowledge which the requester expects the student to take into 
account for correct task-performance, but which cannot be recovered by the 
student.  
(6) This non-shared knowledge accounts for tacit expectations about how the 
recipient should cooperate in the joint project initiated by the request. Since 
these expectations remain opaque to the student, s/he does not contribute in a 
way which the instructor deems to be adequate and a breakdown of 
intersubjective cooperation results. Such breakdowns are aggravated by addi-
tional restrictions on the accomplishment of intersubjectivity, such as refusals 
to negotiate on plans and understandings, insufficient accounts even upon re-
quest, lack of knowledge checks and understanding displays, etc. 
(7) Breakdowns of intersubjective cooperation are unilaterally attributed to the 
student as moral deficit by the instructor, resulting in negative other-position-
ing of the student.  
These findings suggest some general structural properties of the relationship be-
tween egocentric turn-design and its consequences for intersubjective cooperation. 
Future research will have to determine which of these findings is generically rele-
vant beyond the articular interaction type 'driving school lessons'. Still, the obser-
vations made in this context may also invite to consider how egocentrism might 
reflect a déformation professionelle, which may be typical of pedagogic settings. 
We saw that most kinds of non-shared private knowledge which regularly create 
problems of intersubjective cooperation in driving school lessons are instructors' 
topographical knowledge, knowledge about expectable traffic conditions and 
driving preferences. These kinds of knowledge result from instructors' recurrent 
own professional experiences. Their biographical entrenchment and teaching rou-
tine may mislead the speaker to erroneously presuppose that this knowledge is 
shared by the current recipient. It may lead to instructional routines which are not 
closely adapted to individual recipients, but which rather address some typified 
and often idealized recipient, and which are not checked by attending to the re-
cipient's situated responses.  
At the same time, acting on the basis of possibly egocentric presuppositions 
may as well function as a socializing character test (cf. Goffman 1966): Setting 
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high standards and creating unfavorable conditions requires the student to try hard 
to be most attentive and to actively anticipate relevant options and act accord-
ingly. In this way, egocentric recipient design can be used to create conditions for 
other-positioning: The respondent has the chance to gain respect by excelling in 
situated displays of flexibility, anticipation, caution, skilled inferencing, interac-
tive checking, etc.; alternatively, s/he risks to be positioned as incompetent and 
even morally deficient (as we could see in the data) if failing to adapt to the in-
structor's tacit expectations. Since it is the teacher who largely unilaterally reduces 
opportunities for intersubjectivity-2 and who produces aggravated conditions for 
the partner's cooperation (cf. Kallmeyer/Schmitt 1996), egocentric action design 
can be a means to exert interactional power.  
In methodological terms, a satisfactory account of the emergence of failures of 
intersubjective cooperation by virtue of failures of recipient design has to identify 
and account for 
(1) the turn-constructional and pragmatic properties of problematic turns, 
(2) recipients' cooperation problems and breakdowns of intersubjectivity because 
of non-shared and non-indexed expectations about recipients' actions, 
(3) the kinds of expectations which the requester took to be violated,  
(4) the sources and background assumptions which motivated the requester's 
expectations about adequate task-performance.  
In socio-cognitive experiments, it is possible to control and manipulate these four 
factors systematically, however, at the cost of the range and the naturalness of the 
phenomena of interest. In data from naturally occurring interaction, however, 
mostly only (1) the design of turns becoming problematic and (2) ensuing cooper-
ation breakdowns become observable in the data, whereas (3) the violated tacit 
expectations and, above all, (4) their sources and background assumptions do 
neither become obvious to the participants nor to the analyst, given the observable 
interactional process. Egocentric presuppositions are mostly not recoverable both 
for participants and analysts in naturally occurring interactions. In contrast, the 
data used in this study are particularly apt for producing a comprehensive and 
systematic account, because they include observable interactional phenomena 
concerning each of these four constituents of the intersubjectivity problem.9 This 
"comprehensive" property of the data points to another important methodological 
demand on interactional studies of recipient design: A fuller grasp of the temporal 
properties of recipient design ranging beyond the narrow scope of the turn-design 
itself and extending into motivating (interactional, biographical) histories and in-
teractional consequences requires the analysis of extended stretches of interac-
tional episodes. This is needed both in order to understand how grounds for re-
cipient design develop in interaction, which precise properties of a recipient actu-
ally are projected, and for which interactional concerns, and how choices of re-
cipient design impinge on future interactional cooperation.  
                                                          
9  Still, since sources and background assumptions of egocentric turn design of the requests are 
only made explicit much later in the interaction and, of course, only fragmentarily, there rests 
some indeterminacy about their precise nature at the time the request was produced.  
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The study has revealed some more general aspects of recipient design which 
have not been studied in prior research.  
Firstly, recipient design does not only concern referential choice, but also in-
telligible projections for next actions made available by action formation. Prior 
studies of recipient design have dealt with the ways in which partner's knowledge 
about referents and states of affairs is used for and presupposed in turn-design 
(see Sacks/Schegloff 1979; Schegloff 1972, 1996; Betz 2015). The function of 
turn design which has been at issue in this study, however, is not that turns are de-
signed so as to allow for (economic) recognition of intended referents talked 
about, but we have been concerned with the projection of trajectories of (collabo-
rative) action. In the data studied this concerns the communication of background 
assumptions which the requester expects the respondent to take into account when 
constructing his/her response. It is not so much that the recipient design of the in-
itial request turn as such proved to be problematic.10 Rather, it is the lack of 
formulating additional compliance-relevant assumptions which makes the design 
of the request egocentric. Therefore, issues of recipient design here do less con-
cern lexical choices of referential expressions. Rather, the use of grammatical 
formats for requesting, the categorization of requested actions, the degree of ex-
plicitness of projections, and the provision of accounts which explain and justify 
requests and the bits of knowledge and expectations implied for expected compli-
ant action matter here as recipient-designing practices of action-formation. 
Secondly, the study has clearly shown how much the recipient design of indi-
vidual turns is a case of the indexicality of action. Its meaning unfolds only in the 
context of an embodied contextual configuration (Goodwin 2000), which includes 
affordances and constraints of space (street), physical objects (cars), semiotic ob-
jects (car controls, road signs, traffic lights, mirrors) and their movements and 
embodied action (gaze, object handling). It builds on prior interactional histories 
and on both shared and private experiences. The recipient design of a turn and the 
definition of the recipient as embodied by situated turn-construction is not already 
sufficiently provided by choices of turn-construction in isolation. 
Thirdly, recipient design is an emergent, temporal phenomenon. It develops 
over interactional histories, by which it is informed and which it reflexively ad-
vances and shapes itself. Recipient design is both retrospectively based and fu-
ture-directed and it is adapted on the basis of the in situ, online-analysis of part-
ner's actions. Recipient design adopts gestalt-like properties over the course of 
interactional episodes, positioning the recipient as a specific participant with a 
rich configuration of often very much personalized, locally task- and topic-rele-
vant personal properties. These are much more detailed and specific than mere 
category membership and role incumbency. This interpretive depth of recipient 
design, however, is not constituted on the spot. It requires interactional time to un-
fold by systematic combination of practices of action and ways of respond to the 
partner's interactional moves.  
Forth, we could show that recipient design does not simply rest on and reflect 
the recipient's knowledge. Recipient design is a feature of action formation which 
may rather be future-directed and strategic than retrospectively based. Recipient 
                                                          
10  This only seemed to be the case in #5, S10, where the imperative was used, which in this con-
text establishes a strong preference for immediate, urgent response. 
Gesprächsforschung 16 (2015), Seite 97 
design may be produced strategically, e.g., when counterfactual recipient design is 
used to test and diagnose the recipient's skills and knowledge. Rather than being 
adaptive to the actual recipient, recipient design then is destined to engender in-
teractional phenomena which reveal who the actual recipient is. Current recipient 
design thus may reflexively be in service of future adaptions of recipient design to 
be performed on the basis of phenomena it helps to bring about itself.  
Fifth, recipient design is perspectival in resting on the actor's perception and 
understanding of the partner, but not on the partner as such. Because of this onto-
logical fact, but also more practically on behalf of simply ignoring to take the re-
cipient's perspective into account, recipient design may be insufficient because of 
egocentricity, which means to presuppose knowledge which is not shared by the 
partner, but which is needed for successful interactional cooperation. Of course, 
egocentricity vs. partner-adequacy is not an "all-or-nothing"-feature, as some cog-
nitive studies may be taken to suggest, but rather a continuum. Degrees and facets 
of egocentricity may be more or less obvious already upon speaker's construction 
of turns at talk, but their interactionally relevant properties only emerge over the 
course of subsequent interactional cooperation. This paper contributes to discover 
the interactional phenomenology of egocentricity in interaction and its interac-
tional consequences. It is thus a step on the way to develop an interactionally 
based, essentially non-cognitive understanding of egocentricity. 
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